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Comparison of Manipulation-proof Measures 
on Hungarian Data*
Dávid Andor Rácz 
The further development of performance measures has managed to remedy some 
of the problems with earlier solutions, but with regard to the measures used most 
widely today, the issue of performance manipulation still needs to be tackled. This 
article presents the manipulation-proof performance measure (MPPM) developed 
by Ingersoll et al. (2007), which addresses this problem in a general sense. The 
MPPM used by Brown et al. (2010) is also detailed, along with the doubt ratio 
they developed, which can be used as a manipulation-detecting measure assessing 
implied risk aversion. With the calculations included here, this paper is one of the 
first to compare the MPPM and doubt ratio values calculated with the methods of 
the two groups of authors, seeking to explain the differences by using data from 
Hungarian absolute return funds as a sample. The results allow the author to be 
the first to propose the use of the more accurate MPPM formula of Ingersoll et 
al. (2007) both for performance measurement and calculation of the doubt ratio.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: G11, G23
Keywords: portfolio selection, investment decisions, investment funds, performance 
assessment
1. Introduction
Although traditional performance measures have eliminated the faults of earlier 
solutions in the course of their development, potential manipulation is still an issue 
in connection with the measures widely cited in the literature and currently used 
by the market. One possible solution to this problem is to use manipulation-proof 
performance measures (hereinafter: MPPM), based on the utility theory well known 
in microeconomics. Due to their structure, these measures are especially suited 
for assessing actively managed funds, since their value can only be increased if 
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the fund manager has actual information or skills. By contrast, it is impossible to 
enhance a fund’s score just by knowing the measure used by the market or the 
performance assessor for performance measurement. This special feature sets apart 
manipulation-proof performance measures from traditional indicators, which can 
be manipulated without extra knowledge or information, simply by knowing the 
indicator.
The article presents the requirements that manipulation-proof measures need to 
meet and how Ingersoll et al. (2007) produced a possible solution to the problem 
and describes the measure defined by Ingersoll et al. (hereinafter: Ingersoll 
measure). The study also touches on the approach used by Brown et al. (2010) 
(hereinafter: Brown approach), which is a linear approximation of the Ingersoll 
formula. The Brown approach allows the measure to be better structured with 
excess return and excess standard deviation, and therefore it can also be used to 
assess implied risk aversion. The new indicator derived in this manner is referred 
to as the doubt ratio, which can indicate the presence of return smoothing or 
performance manipulation in the case of extreme values. As Brown et al. (2010) 
offered several ways to calculate the doubt ratio, including calculation of the MPPM 
with various risk aversion factors, not only the Ingersoll and Brown MPPM values 
were calculated here, but also the doubt ratios based on them.
The article looks at issues previously not discussed: What is the relationship between 
the results of the Ingersoll and the Brown MPPM and the doubt ratio (implied risk 
aversion)? What could explain any differences detected? Taking into account the 
results and the practical calculation requirements of the two different methods, 
which method should be used for calculating the MPPM and the doubt ratio? 
Using data from Hungarian absolute return investment funds as a sample, our own 
calculations are used to show that the results of the Ingersoll and the Brown MPPM 
and doubt ratio almost completely overlap; however, the difference between them 
and the corresponding reasons are also indicated.
The study is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the characteristics of 
manipulation-proof performance measures, providing Ingersoll’s solution. Section 
3 then outlines the identification of manipulated performance, the Brown approach 
and the doubt ratio defined by them. After that, Section 4 compares the Ingersoll 
and Brown MPPM values and doubt ratios using data from Hungarian absolute 
return investment funds, and determines which method should be used in which 
situation, based on the results and the complexity of the calculations in practice. 
The paper ends with a brief summary and the conclusions.
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2. Manipulation-proof performance measures
Based on the literature, the assessment of actively managed portfolios can be 
approached from several aspects: Amihud et al. (2015) analyse the effect of the 
pricing of illiquidity, Gemmill et al. (2006) assess investment funds taking into 
account loss aversion. When examining fair risk allocation, Csóka and Pintér (2016) 
acknowledge and Balog et al. (2017) clarify that there is no risk allocation method 
that is always applicable, stable and motivating at the same time. Zawadowski 
(2017) presents a disappointing correlation in investment fund managers’ focus 
on commission, because according to his results, the fund managers who demand 
a higher commission cannot generate more excess return than that in exchange: 
on the contrary, 1 percentage point higher fees are coupled with over 1 percentage 
point lower performance on average (Jensen’s alpha) compared to the benchmark 
rate. There is ample literature on measuring the returns and risks of investment 
funds as well as identifying the factors that influence fund performance.1
Traditional performance measures have eliminated the faults of earlier solutions 
during the course of their development. The Sharpe ratio (Sharpe 1966) only 
explains whether an investment fund provides adequate excess return for one unit 
of excess risk taken, but it does not show the relationship between the benchmark 
and the investment fund’s performance, in other words it does not break down 
investment fund performance into the performance arising from the change in 
the market/benchmark and the performance arising from the individual decisions 
of the investment fund manager. Therefore, it cannot be used to determine how 
exactly the fund manager was able to underperform or outperform the benchmark.
On the other hand, Jensen’s alpha (Jensen 1969) clearly demonstrates superior 
and inferior performance compared to the benchmark index, and its calculation 
is also fairly simple. The problem with it, however, is that it only shows the return 
achieved by the fund manager relative to the benchmark, but not the additional 
risk taken. The extent to which the portfolio created by the fund manager through 
overweighting is riskier than the benchmark cannot be ascertained.
The information ratio (Treynor and Black 1973) combines the two approaches, as it 
shows the excess return achieved by the fund manager for one unit of risk actively 
taken (Jensen’s alpha divided by its standard deviation). The information ratio is 
basically a modified Sharpe ratio: instead of the risk-free rate, the excess return 
relative to the benchmark is compared to the additional risk taken relative to the 
benchmark index.
1  Blake et al. (1993); Elton et al. (1996a); Carhart (1997); Bóta and Ormos (2016); Erdős and Ormos (2009); 
Bóta (2014)
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However, when assessing absolute return investment funds, the lack of an 
appropriate benchmark index is a huge problem, as these investment funds do 
not track clearly and properly defined indices. Instead, they aim to achieve positive 
returns in all market conditions, coupled with low volatility. The literature offers 
several approaches to manage this problem. These seek to introduce performance 
measures that are independent from benchmarks and able to appropriately assess 
the risk-return combinations even if the return distribution of the investment fund 
is abnormal. One possible solution is to use factors representing investment styles 
to calculate a modified information ratio (Pojarliev and Levich 2013). However, 
using the necessary factors is quite difficult in the case of these investment funds. 
Another issue is manipulation.2 The other possible solution for the problem related 
to the assessment of absolute return investment funds is to use manipulation-proof 
performance measures.
This article does not use the term “manipulation-proof” in the sense of 
non-manipulability from the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem well known in 
microeconomics.3 Here, the focus is not on how vulnerable a social choice function 
is to manipulation. Instead, what is attempted here is to prevent fund managers 
from boosting their own performance-based remuneration and bonuses simply by 
being familiar with the performance measure which is used to assess them. Fund 
managers who have no material extra knowledge or information to base their 
investment decisions on, but are aware of the weaknesses of the measure used 
for assessing them should not be able to make decisions that do not in fact increase 
the utility of the investors holding the investment fund but still raise the value of 
the assessment measure. The goal is to use an assessment system that rewards 
only those investment decisions that truly enhance the utility of investors, those 
that can only be made by fund managers who have more information or better 
skills than the market, and use these to effectively and profitably deviate from the 
market benchmark portfolio’s composition.
It has already been demonstrated that there are trading and reporting techniques 
that boost the value of traditional performance measures without actually 
increasing the investors’ utility on the risk-return spectrum. These methods can 
be best illustrated in the case of the Sharpe ratio, because it has a relatively simple 
structure: it compares the excess return over the risk-free rate to the standard 
deviation of the portfolio. One possible manipulation is so-called return smoothing, 
when fund managers report their losses stretched out and averaged out for a longer 
period, for example by subjectively stating assets that are illiquid, rarely priced and 
difficult to assess (Abdulali 2006). The reported average excess return does not 
change, but the detected standard deviation declines, and therefore ultimately 
2  Abdulali (2006); Bollen and Pool (2009); Ingersoll et al. (2007); Qian and Yu (2015)
3  See, for example, Mas-Colell et al. (1995) Chapter 23
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the risk-adjusted performance appears to improve. There is also so-called dynamic 
manipulation when, for example, after a lucky gain at the beginning of the period 
under review the fund manager protects the profits by resorting to risk-free 
investments for the remaining period, making the risk-adjusted performance 
high, since its standard deviation will be close to zero. However, this choice is still 
suboptimal, and it does not provide the greatest utility to investors, because the 
fund manager should probably hold some risky assets in the remaining period, 
too. Ingersoll et al. (2007) present other investment strategies using options as 
well, which result in unreasonably high Sharpe ratio values. For example, the fund 
manager sells an OTM option with 1-month maturity at the beginning of the period, 
and the money from that as well as the already existing funds are invested in risk-
free assets. If the option expires worthless (the probability of this is strictly positive), 
the fund manager achieves positive returns with zero standard deviation and thus 
an infinite Sharpe ratio. Due to the positive probability, the expected value of this 
strategy also generates an infinite Sharpe ratio.
Nevertheless, it was also shown that there may exist properly constructed 
performance measures that are able to eliminate the above-mentioned problems 
based on a utility approach. The results of manipulation-proof performance 
measures cannot be improved by smoothing in the reports, in other words 
returns reported averaged out, leaving the average return unchanged. Moreover, 
the value of manipulation-proof performance measures can only be increased 
by deviating from the market benchmark portfolio by overweighting certain 
investment elements. These investment decisions are based on fund managers’ 
extra information compared to the market or their ability to create genuine value 
added, thanks to their timing and selection skills. Another advantage is that 
these measures’ assumptions do not include the normal distribution of returns, 
and therefore their results are less distorted in the case of a skewed or fat-tailed 
distribution of returns, in contrast to traditional performance measures that 
typically assume normal distribution and thus are more sensitive to the distortions 
caused by the abnormal distributions seen in real life.
Manipulation-proof performance measures are characterised by the following 
conditions:
1)  They should generate a single valued score for ranking.
2)  The score should not depend upon the portfolio’s monetary value, only the 
return percentage.
3)  Uninformed investors should not achieve a higher estimated score by deviating 
from the benchmark, however, informed investors should be able to do so by 
taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities.
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4)  The measures should be consistent with standard financial market equilibrium 
conditions.
If any of these conditions is not met, there is at least one way for active portfolio 
managers to enhance or manipulate their score by using strategies that result in 
seemingly better risk-return distributions but in reality achieve the higher score 
without genuine performance and without increasing the utility of investors.
The first condition excludes the measures that only make an incomplete ranking 
as well as the useless ones that, for example, merely list the returns. The second 
condition simply states that returns in themselves are sufficient statistics, while 
monetary gains and losses are not. For instance, the absolute net asset value of 
the fund cannot be relevant in ranking. Just because one fund has more assets than 
the other, the former does not necessarily perform better. The third and fourth 
conditions express that uninformed investors cannot profit by deviating from the 
benchmark, for example by trying to change the investment fund’s score on the 
observable data, whereas the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities should be 
reflected in the score. The measure should not be enhanced without value or 
information added by, for example, using simple return smoothing, the manipulated 
reporting of averaged returns or completely shifting to risk-free investments after 
a lucky streak to reduce volatility. At the same time, the measure should detect 
the investment decisions that genuinely increase utility, and consequently assign 
higher and higher scores to these results. The authors show that these conditions 
are fulfilled if the measure is:
•  increasing for the returns (monotonic),
•  concave,
•  time-separable,
•  shaped as a power function.
The first condition ensures that the measure acknowledges arbitrage opportunities. 
The second prevents the achievement of higher scores merely by increasing 
leverage or adding unpriced risk. In other words, not only the returns but also the 
risks taken matter. The third condition prevents dynamic or temporal manipulation. 
The fourth ensures consistency with the financial market equilibrium theory, and 
the different returns should be taken from different times to replace returns from 
different outcomes.
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The Ingersoll measure, which meets these conditions, is the following (1):
 
Θˆ = 1
1− ρ( )Δt ln
1
T
1+ rt
1+ rft
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
1−ρ
t=1
T
∑
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ .
 
(1)
where Θˆ estimates the risk-adjusted return premium of the investment fund. For 
a given Θˆ, the portfolio’s score is the same as the annualised return of a continuously 
compounded risk-free asset, which is higher than the risk-free rate by the value of Θˆ. 
rt is the return of the fund, rft is the risk-free rate and ρ is the relative risk aversion 
ratio. If ρ = 1, then measure (1) is not interpretable. If ρ > 1, then measure (1) usually 
takes a positive value, since the ratio of 1 + rt and 1 + rft is generally greater than 
1, and 1 – ρ is negative in the denominator of the first fraction and the exponent, 
therefore the logarithm is also negative, while the product is positive. And if ρ < 1, 
measure (1) is still expected to take a positive value by the former logic, but in this 
case 1 – ρ has a positive value in both places, and the logarithm is also positive, 
just like the product.
The MPPM can also be identified with the benchmark index. For the uninformed 
investors, the benchmark should be a desirable, ideal investment target with a high 
score. If the lognormal return of the benchmark is 1 + rb, then the parameter ρ is 
the following:
ln E 1+ rb( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦− ln 1+ rf( )
Var ln 1+ rb( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ .
ρ usually has a value between 0.2 and 10, according to empirical evidence from the 
literature. Arrow (1971) argues that it is around 1, the results of Szpiro and Outreville 
(1988) show that it is between 1 and 5, and the average ratio is 2.89. Layard et 
al. (2008) also observed values of roughly 1. It is approximately 2 according to the 
studies by Friend and Blume (1975) and Kydland and Prescott (1982). Gandelman 
and Hernandez-Murillo (2015) claim that it varies across countries, with a typical 
value of 1, and even the values of outlier countries are within the 0–3 range.
Both the Ingersoll and the Brown measure used risk aversion factors between 2 
and 4. Ingersoll et al. (2007) justified this by stating that even though according 
to empirical data it would be theoretically possible to make the calculations with 
a broader range, the relative risk aversion factor of between 2 and 4 corresponds 
to portfolios whose leverage is between 1.75 and 0.75. And this range covers most 
funds to be ranked. The selected Hungarian investment funds exhibit similar values 
based on the portfolio reports: out of 32 funds 23, or 72 per cent of the funds under 
review, belong to this range. Brown et al. (2010) decided to use risk aversion factors 
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between 2 and 4 to facilitate comparability to the results by Ingersoll et al. (2007). 
To ensure comparability here as well, risk aversion factors between 2 and 4 are 
used in the calculations below.
3. Detecting manipulated performance and defining the doubt ratio
According to the Brown formula, the linear approximation of MPPM (1) is:
 
Θˆ p( )= 1Δt x +
1− ρ
2
sx
*( )2{ } , (2)
where x  is the average of the excess return and sx
*( )2 = sx2 T −1( ) /T  is the variance 
of the excess return calculated from the sample. 
This MPPM version allowed the simple statement of the so-called doubt ratio (DR), 
which deduces the development of implied risk aversion from the measure values 
calculated from various risk aversion ratios.
 
DR =
Θˆ 2( )
Θˆ 2( )−Θˆ 3( ) +2≈
2x
sx
*( )2
+1  (3)
An extremely high doubt ratio suggests extreme risk aversion, which is a potential 
sign of performance manipulation. Brown et al. (2010) found 34 hedge funds 
with doubt ratios of over 150 at a 5 per cent significance level, representing 2 per 
cent of the total sample under review. 80 per cent of these 34 funds were flagged 
as suspicious by five alternative statistical approaches with respect to return 
manipulation, so the analysis performed with the doubt ratio is consistent with 
the other statistical methods indicating manipulation, and an extremely high doubt 
ratio is a good indicator of potential performance manipulation or return smoothing 
(see Table 1).
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Table 1
Funds with an extremely high doubt ratio
Style Not detected Detected Total
< 1% < 5% % < 1% < 5% %
Convertible arbitrage 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 38
Emerging markets 1 1 1.0% 2 2 2.0% 98
Equity market neutral 0 0 0.0% 3 3 4.6% 65
Event-driven 0 2 1.5% 2 5 3.7% 135
Fixed-income arbitrage 1 1 1.8% 0 2 3.6% 55
Fund of funds 0 0 0.0% 9 11 2.1% 531
Global macro 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 53
Long/short equity hedge 1 1 0.2% 0 1 0.2% 489
Managed futures 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 125
Multi-strategy 1 2 1.7% 1 3 2.5% 121
Total 4 7 0.4% 17 27 1.6% 1710
Note: Based on Brown et al. (2010:58)
4. Calculating MPPM and the doubt ratio on return data of Hungarian 
absolute return investment funds
The MPPM and doubt ratio values calculated with the two different methods 
are compared here using data on absolute return funds traded in Hungary and 
denominated in HUF. 32 investment funds listed in Table 2 were picked for the 
analysis that are in the category of absolute return investment funds, denominated 
in HUF, public, open-end, and whose return data for the analysis period between 
28 April 2010 and 27 April 2017 were available on the website of the Association of 
Hungarian Investment Fund and Asset Management Companies (BAMOSZ) at the 
time when the data were downloaded, comprising a total of 56,832 daily returns. 
When choosing the analysis period, it was crucial that the sample cover a period 
without structural breaks and contain funds traded continuously until the date of 
download to ensure consistent comparisons. Since the analysis seeks to compare 
the Ingersoll and the Brown approach and not to measure the overall market 
performance in the segment of absolute return investment funds, any potential 
survivorship bias (the bias or overestimation of measured performance arising from 
the fact that only those funds are examined that operated from the beginning to 
the end of the period under review, so the results are not adjusted downwards by 
the poor performance of the funds that ceased operating in the meantime, Elton et 
al. 1996b) probably has a negligible effect on the comparison of the two methods 
on the sample.
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Table 2
The selected absolute return funds
No. Name of fund ISIN code of fund
1 Aberdeen Diversified Growth Fund of Funds Class “B” HU0000704549
2 Aberdeen Diversified Growth Fund of Funds Class “I” HU0000704556
3 Aegon Alfa Absolute Return Investment Fund HU0000703970
4 AEGON MoneyMaxx Expressz HU0000703145
5 Aegon ÓzonMaxx Total Return Investment Fund HU0000705157
6 AEGON Smart Money Investment Fund of Funds HU0000708169
7 Budapest Control Total Return Derivatives Fund HU0000702741
8 Citadella Derivative Investment Fund HU0000707948
9 Concorde Columbus Global Value Derivative Investment Fund HU0000705702
10 Concorde PB2 Fund of Funds HU0000704705
11 Concorde Rubicon Derivative Investment Fund HU0000707252
12 Concorde VM Absolute Derivative Investment Fund HU0000703749
13 Erste DPM Open-ended Alternative Fund of Funds HU0000705314
14 Erste Multistrategy Absolute Return Fund of Funds HU0000705322
15 Generali IPO Absolute Return Fund HU0000706791
16 Generali Spirit Absolute Derivative Fund HU0000706833
17 Generali Titanium Total Return Fund HU0000706817
18 OTP Absolute Return Open-ended Derivative Fund HU0000704457
19 OTP EMDA Derivative Fund HU0000706361
20 OTP G10 Euro Derivative Fund HU0000706221
21 OTP Supra Derivative Investment Fund HU0000706379
22 OTP New Europe Open-ended Securities Fund HU0000705827
23 Platina Alfa Derivative Investment Fund HU0000704648
24 Platina Beta Derivative Investment Fund HU0000704655
25 Platina Delta Derivative Investment Fund HU0000704671
26 Platina Gamma Derivative Investment Fund HU0000704663
27 Platina Pi Derivative Investment Fund HU0000704689
28 Raiffeisen Hozam Premium Derivative Fund HU0000703699
29 Raiffeisen Index Premium Derivative Fund HU0000703707
30 Raiffeisen Private Pannonia Fund of Funds HU0000705231
31 Sovereign PB Derivatives Fund HU0000707732
32 Takarek Total Return Investment Fund HU0000707997
Note: On 11 September 2017 Concorde Asset Management was renamed to HOLD Asset Management.
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4.1. Treatment of the risk-free rate
The risk-free rate used was the 12-month benchmark rate of the Government 
Debt Management Agency, because the return on these short-term government 
securities is risk-free and it also accurately reflects the major changes of the 
risk-free rate in the period under review. The MPPM was calculated taking into 
account the monthly changes in the 12-month benchmark rate. To calculate the 
daily continuously compounded risk-free rate for the given period, one has to take 
the value of the relevant monthly risk-free rate and transform with the logarithmic 
function the nominal annual return shown in the Government Debt Management 
Agency’s database with effective return calculation, then prorate it from the 
annualised return to daily return, for 250 trading days, using the following formula:
 
rft continuous( ) =
ln 100+Rft100( )
250
. (4)
4.2. Treatment of the fund returns
The daily log returns can be determined by downloading the daily unit price data 
from the BAMOSZ website and using the following formula:
 
rt = ln
Pt
Pt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ .
 (5)
4.3. Determining MPPM values with the Ingersoll formula
The Ingersoll MPPM values need to be determined for ρ = 2, ρ = 3 and ρ = 4. In all 
three cases, first the return premium from the given period over the risk-free rate 
should be raised to the power of 1 – ρ to adjust the return ratio by the risk:
 
Risk adjusted return premium= 1+ rt
1+ rft
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1−ρ
, (6)
then the log of the average risk-adjusted return premium calculated for the whole 
period is divided by 1 – ρ:
 
1
1− ρ( ) ln
1
T
Risk adjusted return premiumt
t=1
T
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ . (7)
Finally, the value of Θˆ calculated for the daily returns is annualised by multiplying 
it for 250 trading days.
 
ΘˆIngersoll =
1
Δt Θˆdaily . (8)
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 Θˆ estimates the risk-adjusted return premium of the investment fund. In other 
words, a given Θˆ is the portfolio’s score that equals the continuously compounded 
and annualised return of a risk-free asset, exceeding the risk-free rate by Θˆ.
4.4. Determining MPPM values with the Brown formula
In the Brown approach, the MPPM can be stated as the difference between the 
average excess return and the variance of the excess return calculated from the 
sample, where the coefficient of the variance is (1 – ρ)/2.
Thus, to calculate the Brown MPPM, one first needs to calculate the average excess 
return by taking the log of the ratio of the daily return of the investment fund and 
the risk-free rate for each day:
 
Return premium= ln 1+ rt
1+ rft
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
, (9)
then their average is calculated for the whole period:
 
x = 1
T
Return premiumt
t=1
T
∑ . (10)
In the Brown approach, the other building block is the calculation of the variance 
of the excess return calculated from the sample.
Finally, the difference between the two values is calculated for the three ρ’s (2, 3 
and 4), where the coefficient of variation is (1 – ρ)/2. The daily Θˆ value derived in 
this manner is prorated for annualised return by multiplying it by 250 trading days.
 
ΘˆBrown =
1
Δt Θˆdaily  (11)
4.5. Comparison of the Ingersoll and Brown MPPM values and rankings
This is one of the first studies to compare the MPPM values calculated with the 
Ingersoll and the Brown formula. Very similar results were derived for the MPPM 
with respect to both the value of the measure and the ranking (Table 3, where, for 
example, “MPPM(3)” in the Ingersoll section means the MPPM value calculated 
with the Ingersoll formula and a risk aversion factor of 3, while “MPPM(3) rank” 
means the ranking of the fund calculated with the same formula). In quantifiable 
terms, this means that correlation is 1 for the MPPM values with a risk aversion 
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factor of 2, and around 0.9999 even with a parameter of 3 or 4. And the rank 
correlation takes a value of 1 even with a risk aversion factor of 2 or 4, exhibiting full 
consistency, while it is 0.9996 with a factor of 3, exhibiting almost full consistency, 
which means that out of the 32 funds under review, 30 received the same ranking 
calculated with the two approaches, and only two funds switch ranks. Out of the 96 
cases of the MPPM ranking of the 32 funds calculated with 3 different risk aversion 
factors, there were only 2 differences: therefore, consistency is 97.92 per cent for 
the two methods.
The percentage differences of the MPPM values derived from the two calculation 
methods are usually below 1 per cent (See Table 3 under “Ingersoll-Brown Δ%”). 
In the case of the OTP EMDA fund, there is a difference of 79.9 per cent with a risk 
aversion of 4, which is the greatest percentage difference, but this does not alter 
the ranking. This is partly because the MPPM values are very close to 0 (Ingersoll 
MPPM –0.0003, Brown MPPM –0.0005), thus the relatively small change in absolute 
value (the value of +0.0002 seen in the “Ingersoll-Brown Δ” section of Table 3 under 
MPPM(4)) means a large percentage change between the two calculation methods. 
On the other hand, compared to the relatively small change in absolute value, the 
MPPM value of the next-ranked investment fund is sufficiently far away.
When changing from the Ingersoll to the Brown formula and using a risk aversion 
factor of 3, the OTP Supra fund sticks out and switches places with the Concorde 
Columbus fund. While the Concorde Columbus values calculated with the two 
methods are identical to six decimal places for all risk aversion factors, in the 
case of the OTP Supra, the MPPM value increases by 2.66 per cent with a risk 
aversion factor of 3 when the Brown approach is used, which is the second greatest 
difference in absolute terms (0.0013). The change in the OTP Supra fund’s MPPM 
that also influences ranking is attributable to the fact that while this fund generates 
the second largest returns, and the standard deviation of its returns is the fourth 
greatest, based on the results, the Brown linear approximation of the MPPM 
penalises risk less than the Ingersoll approach. The switched ranking of the two 
funds is also due to the fact that with a risk aversion factor of 3 there is a relatively 
large difference between the two approaches in absolute terms, and compared to 
that the difference between the MPPM values of the two funds is relatively small.
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Table 3
Comparison of the Ingersoll and Brown MPPM values and rankings
 
Concorde  
Columbus
Sovereign PB 
Derivatives
OTP  
EMDA
OTP  
Supra
Ingersoll  
MPPM(2) 0.0500 –0.0523 0.0435 0.0612
MPPM(3) 0.0486 –0.0544 0.0216 0.0475
MPPM(4) 0.0472 –0.0566 –0.0003 0.0330
MPPM(2) rank 6 32 8 2
MPPM(3) rank 5 31 10 6
MPPM(4) rank 5 31 16 7
Brown
MPPM(2) 0.0500 –0.0523 0.0435 0.0615
MPPM(3) 0.0486 –0.0542 0.0215 0.0488
MPPM(4) 0.0472 –0.0561 –0.0005 0.0361
MPPM(2) rank 6 32 8 2
MPPM(3) rank 6 31 10 5
MPPM(4) rank 5 31 16 7
Ingersoll-Brown Δ
MPPM(2) 8.10673E–07 –5.02266E–05 3.8088E–05 –0.000291847
MPPM(3) 1.65408E–06 –0.0002099 0.000122 –0.001266
MPPM(4) 2.51586E–06 –0.0004900 0.000243 –0.003065
MPPM(2) rank 0 0 0 0
MPPM(3) rank –1 0 0 1
MPPM(4) rank 0 0 0 0
Ingersoll-Brown Δ%
MPPM(2) 0.0016 0.0960 0.0875 –0.4768
MPPM(3) 0.0034 0.3860 0.5642 –2.6627
MPPM(4) 0.0053 0.8663 –79.92 –9.2836
Note: In the table, yellow denotes the cases where the rankings were switched when calculated with the 
Ingersoll and the Brown approach, while orange denotes the cases where the MPPM values differed 
substantially between the two methods (either in absolute value or relatively).
4.6. Comparison of the doubt ratio values calculated from the Ingersoll and the 
Brown MPPM and the Brown approximation
Until now, the doubt ratio has never been calculated in practice with the Ingersoll 
and the Brown formula to compare the results. The doubt ratio can be determined 
based on Brown et al. (2010) (3) by comparing the MPPM values calculated with 
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different risk aversion ratios and estimating the value of the implied risk aversion 
ratio. Based on the Ingersoll MPPM4 values, the formula is as follows:
 
DR =
ΘˆIngersoll 2( )
ΘˆIngersoll 2( )−ΘˆIngersoll 3( )
+2  (12)
Based on the Brown MPPM5 values, the formula is modified as follows:
 
DR =
ΘˆBrown 2( )
ΘˆBrown 2( )−ΘˆBrown 3( )
+2  (13)
According to the Brown approximation, the doubt ratio can also be calculated as the 
ratio of the average excess return and the variance of the excess return calculated 
from the sample:
 
DR ≈ 2x
sx
*( )2
+1  (14)
The doubt ratio value is practically almost identical when calculated using the 
formula based on the Brown MPPM or the Brown approximation (to 13 decimal 
places); thus, the calculated ranking is also identical, and rank correlation and 
correlation take a value of 1, exhibiting full consistency. When calculating from the 
Ingersoll or the Brown MPPM (or using the Brown approximation), very similar 
results are obtained: the correlation and the rank correlation are 0.999. The doubt 
ratio ranking is identical with all three calculation methods in 29 cases out of the 
32 investment funds under review, representing 90.6 per cent of the funds.
Only two funds exhibited major differences in the doubt ratio values calculated 
with the Ingersoll and the Brown MPPM (and the Brown approximation) (Table 4 
“DR(Ingersoll)-DR(Brown) Δ” and “DR(Ingersoll)-DR(Brown approximation) Δ”): 
OTP Supra and Sovereign PB Derivatives. The different values cause a change in 
ranking in only the latter case (Table 4 „DR(Ingersoll)-DR(Brown) rankingΔ”). The 
5.65 per cent change in the case of the OTP Supra fund is relatively small in absolute 
terms, and the subsequent doubt ratio value is sufficiently far away. However, the 
Sovereign PB Derivatives Fund is ranked two places lower in the Brown ranking 
than in the Ingersoll ranking, whereas the Raiffeisen Hozamprémium és Raiffeisen 
Indexprémium values that precede it are hardly modified, and there was no 
change in their relative ranking either. The change in ranking is ultimately caused 
by the major drop in value (–8.97 per cent) in the Sovereign PB Derivatives Fund, 
and the fact that the subsequent funds’ doubt ratio values are close enough to 
4  See formula (1).
5  See formula (2).
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enable a change in rankings. This fund exhibited the third largest MPPM change in 
absolute value and the fourth largest percentage change with a risk aversion factor 
of 3 when calculated with the Brown approach compared to the Ingersoll version 
(0.386 per cent), and the results show that the MPPM difference was magnified 
when transferred to the doubt ratio values (8.97 per cent).
4.7. Comparison of the Ingersoll and the Brown method based on practical 
applicability and the complexity of their implementation, proposal for the 
preferred method
The calculations showed the applicability and the difficulty of implementation as 
well as practical aspects of the differences between the methods in the case of 32 
Hungarian absolute return investment funds.
With respect to MPPM calculation, there is no major difference between the two 
approaches as regards difficulty or the necessary calculation steps. While the 
Ingersoll formula takes the average of the risk-adjusted return premia in the period, 
and then adjusts it with a logarithm and the risk aversion factor, the Brown approach 
calculates using the simple difference of the average excess returns in the period 
and the variance, where the risk aversion factor is included as the coefficient of 
variation. So the Brown approach uses an additional step when calculating the 
variance of excess returns, and this facilitates the better understanding of the 
logic behind the MPPM structure by quantifying risk. Since the Brown MPPM is 
a linear approximation of the more accurate Ingersoll MPPM, and according to the 
calculations there are differences between the two methods that influence ranking, 
the Ingersoll approach should be used to calculate MPPM. The calculation of the 
Brown MPPM or the steps necessary for that are recommended if the analysis also 
seeks to find out the average and standard deviation of excess return to ensure the 
better understanding of the correlations.
The calculation of the doubt ratio includes the same steps using both the Ingersoll 
and the Brown MPPM values (or the Brown approach to the doubt ratio); therefore, 
they require exactly the same effort. Taking into account the observed inaccuracy 
of the Brown MPPM formula arising from the linear approach, the doubt ratio can 
be more accurately calculated from the Ingersoll MPPM, and therefore the use of 
the latter is recommended.
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5. Summary, conclusions
The development of performance measures has managed to remedy the problems 
of earlier solutions, but in the case of the measures popular in the literature and 
used most widely today, the issue of performance manipulation still needs to 
be tackled. This article outlined the Ingersoll manipulation-proof performance 
measure, which solves this general problem when assessing investment funds and 
hedge funds. The Brown MPPM version was also described, which is the linear 
approximation of the Ingersoll measure. Furthermore, the doubt ratio developed by 
Brown et al. (2010) was presented, which can be used as a manipulation-detecting 
measure because it measures implied risk aversion. By using data from Hungarian 
absolute return funds for our own calculations, it was shown how the change in 
MPPM and implied risk aversion can be calculated in practice using the measures 
of the two groups of authors.
This was among the first comparisons of the MPPMs calculated with the two 
different methods, and the first in the case of the doubt ratio. It was shown that 
the results of the Ingersoll and the Brown MPPM and doubt ratio almost completely 
overlap, and the reasons behind the small number of differences observed were 
examined.
In the case of the MPPM, the ranking is the same with both methods for all 
32 funds, using a risk aversion factor of 2 or 4. Only the risk aversion factor of 3 
produced differences, and even then 30 out of the 32 funds under review received 
the same ranking, with only two switching places when calculated with the different 
approaches. This is partly because with a risk aversion factor of 3, the difference 
between the MPPM values of the two funds is relatively small, whichever method 
is used. On the other hand, one of the two funds concerned has the second largest 
returns and the fourth largest standard deviation of returns, while the other has 
average values in terms of both, and the results attest that the Brown linear 
approximation of the MPPM penalises risk less than the Ingersoll approach.
When calculating the doubt ratio from the Ingersoll and the Brown MPPM (and 
using the Brown approximation), very similar results are derived, the correlation 
and the rank correlation are 0.999. The ranking is identical with all three calculation 
methods in 29 cases out of the 32 investment funds under review, representing 
90.6 per cent of the funds. The difference is attributable to the fact that a huge 
drop in value is observed in the case of one fund between the Ingersoll and the 
Brown approach, and the subsequent funds’ doubt ratio values are also relatively 
close, while their values are not significantly modified, and they retain their relative 
ranking. This fund exhibited the third largest MPPM change in absolute value and 
the fourth largest percentage change with a risk aversion factor of 3 when calculated 
with the Brown approach compared to the Ingersoll version (–0.386 per cent), and 
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the results show that the MPPM difference was magnified when transferred to the 
doubt ratio values (8.97 per cent).
The results of the calculation led to the following conclusions:
1.  The Brown linear approximation of the MPPM penalises risk less than the Ingersoll 
approach.
2.  The larger changes in the MPPM values observed between the Ingersoll and 
the Brown approach are usually magnified when transferred to the doubt ratio 
calculated from them.
3.  A change in ranking between the two methods is seen for both the MPPM and 
the doubt ratio if the observed change is large enough and the values of the 
funds ranked near the fund concerned are close enough to its values, so that this 
change in value affects ranking.
4.  Since there is no significant difference between the Ingersoll and the Brown 
MPPM calculation as regards difficulty or the number of steps required, and 
since the Brown approach, the inaccuracy of which sometimes alters the ranking, 
is merely a linear approximation of the Ingersoll MPPM, the MPPM calculation 
is recommended to be performed using the more accurate Ingersoll approach. 
However, the Brown method may be useful for analysis purposes when calculating 
the average and standard deviation of excess return.
5.  This first comparison showed that the doubt ratio can be more accurately 
calculated from the Ingersoll MPPM, therefore the use of this approach is 
recommended.
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